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Abstract—This paper describes the quantitative application of the 
theory of System Health Management and its operational subset, 
Fault Management, to the selection of abort triggers for a 
human-rated launch vehicle, the United States’ National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Space Launch 
System (SLS). The results demonstrate the efficacy of the theory 
to assess the effectiveness of candidate failure detection and 
response mechanisms to protect humans from time-critical and 
severe hazards. The quantitative method was successfully used on 
the SLS to aid selection of its suite of abort triggers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of System Health Management (SHM) is to 
“preserve the system’s ability to function as intended.” SHM 
provides the capabilities that preserve functionality, and can be 
divided into passive capabilities such as design margins and 
operational capabilities such as failure detection, isolation, and 
response (FDIR). These latter operational capabilities are 
termed Fault Management (FM), and are implemented as 
control loops, known as FM Control Loops (FMCLs). The 
FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in 
the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within 
acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control 
action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state 
[1]. 
As a type of control loop, aspects of control theory can be 
applied to understanding FMCLs. Control theory divides 
control loops into two major portions: state estimation and state 
control. Performance of control loops is also divided into two 
pieces, with separate metrics to determine the performance of 
state estimation and state control. For FMCLs, state estimation 
can be measured and assessed using “confusion matrix” 
parameters: false positive, false negative, true positive and true 
negative. State control assessments are based on the speed of 
the FM response compared to the current or impending failure 
effects that it mitigates.  
This paper describes how this theory has been successfully 
applied on the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) 
Program to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of proposed 
abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect 
the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS vehicle. An 
abort trigger, in context of SLS, is the means by which the SLS 
detects a crew-threatening failure and sends a recommendation 
to the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) to initiate an abort 
response. An abort response during ascent enables the MPCV 
with its astronaut crew to escape from a failing SLS and safely 
return to Earth. The success or failure of the abort is ultimately 
measured by the probability that the crew returns safely to 
Earth in situations when failure threatens their safety. The 
value of an abort trigger is assessed by its contribution to 
enabling the MPCV and crew to escape the SLS-caused threat 
and hence minimizing the likelihood of Loss of Crew (LOC). 
The effectiveness of abort triggers is one important factor in the 
calculation of LOC, and hence to verify the program LOC 
requirements. 
The methods described in the remainder of this paper 
provide one crucial set of information to risk-informed design 
and to the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods that 
support it:  the effectiveness of FMCLs to mitigate the effect of 
failures. This paper describes one particular example of this 
general problem: the calculation of the improvement to crew 
safety gained (measured as LOC Benefit) by adding abort 
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triggers to the design, compared to the cost of adding such 
abort triggers (measured as Loss of Mission (LOM) Cost and 
the small additional LOC Cost). For FM, to date there have 
been few instances of quantitative assessment of the value or 
performance of FMCLs. Or, at least these authors are unaware 
of any full application of these ideas for entire FMCLs for a 
system, though there have been numerous assessments of parts 
of FMCLs in many systems. We believe that the assessments 
and metrics applied here may be the first such application for 
entire suites of FMCLs for a large complex system such as a 
launch vehicle and crew capsule. 
Even though this paper describes the application of FM 
theory to the assessment and selection of a launch vehicle abort 
trigger suite, much of the methodology described here applies 
to any system in which FM is applied to predict, detect, and 
respond to failures. This paper describes the kinds of 
quantitative metrics by which FM is assessed for state 
estimation and state control, and demonstrates typical issues 
involved in applying those metrics to FM design and 
operations. It therefore provides insights that can be applied to 
any complex system in which prospective or current failures 
must be mitigated. 
II. FAULT MANAGEMENT METRICS AND APPLICATION TO 
HUMAN-RATED LAUNCH VEHICLE ABORT TRIGGERS 
A. Abort Conditions and Triggers 
NASA’s SLS, managed and integrated by Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC), is intended to fly both humans and 
cargo, though unlike the Space Shuttle, only on separate SLS 
missions. For its crewed, human-rated configuration, an abort 
trigger is a specific type of failure detection that detects the 
existence of an “abort condition,” which is a state or behavior 
whose existence implies a current or impending threat to crew 
safety. Most crew threatening failures ultimately result in one 
of three major situations: explosions of the launch vehicle, loss 
of control of the launch vehicle, or inability to achieve orbit 
even though the vehicle is otherwise able to fly normally. The 
need to escape from an exploding launch vehicle is obvious. 
Loss of control usually leads to an explosion as well, but the 
immediate threat is that the crew will be unable to safely abort 
off the launch vehicle that is oriented in the wrong direction. 
Finally, an abort is ultimately needed if the MPCV will be 
unable to achieve orbit. However, in these relatively benign 
scenarios, the MPCV generally has anywhere from a few 
seconds to a few minutes to abort from the stable launch 
vehicle. 
While some abort triggers directly detect these three 
ultimate situations, some abort triggers detect precursors to 
these situations. Ideally, the latter is preferred due to warning 
time provided, however, except for limited failure scenarios, 
detecting all precursors with certainty is not currently 
technologically feasible. Triggers that pick up loss of control 
include decisions based on the vehicle attitude error that has 
exceeded its controllability threshold. Other abort triggers 
detect loss of communication with key components, which then 
cannot be controlled, which will eventually cause loss of 
vehicle control. These same triggers can also be indirect 
indicators of a structural collapse or explosion that has 
destroyed the components or communication to those 
components. Other abort triggers detect conditions relating to 
high or low solid rocket booster pressures or liquid propellant 
rocket engine temperatures. These indicate impending rupture 
of the solid rocket boosters or combustion chamber explosions. 
When an abort trigger detects an abort condition, there are 
two possible situations. The first is that an abort is needed 
immediately. In this situation, it sends a message, called an 
“abort recommendation,” to the MPCV. The second situation is 
when an abort is not required immediately, but will be required 
eventually. This happens in cases of slow-developing failures, 
or in cases in which the SLS will not achieve the desired orbit. 
In these cases, the SLS sends a warning message, not an abort 
recommendation. 
In either case, only the MPCV or the crew inside the 
MPCV can initiate an abort action. The Flight Director in the 
Mission Control Center can also command the crew to initiate 
an abort based on telemetry data received from the SLS and 
MPCV. For situations that require an immediate abort, as 
designated by the SLS abort recommendation message, a set of 
MPCV computer algorithms known as the abort decision logic, 
will immediately and automatically initiate an abort. In cases in 
which the abort response is not required immediately, the crew 
has time to select the best time to abort. 
The process used to identify abort conditions and potential 
abort triggers includes a variety of methods. Since SLS is 
composed of both new and existing hardware and software, 
some abort conditions and potential triggers are readily 
identified since they were defined or used in this fashion on 
prior programs. For example, the RS-25 Core Stage Engines 
(CSE) used on SLS are the same as were used on the Space 
Shuttle, but with upgraded controller electronics. These Space 
Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) have the capability to detect 
impending engine failures and shut themselves down through 
its failure detection and response capabilities, and these 
demonstrated capabilities are maintained for the SLS. Similarly 
the Space Shuttle and Constellation Ares I programs both used 
Solid Rocket Boosters and provided sensors and other 
hardware that can be used to detect booster pressures. This is 
an obvious candidate for use on the SLS as well. 
Other abort conditions and potential abort triggers must be 
identified by assessment of new or evolving SLS designs. This 
is particularly true for the SLS Core Stage, which houses most 
of the avionics that controls the entire launch vehicle, with the 
exception of the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), 
which acts as the upper stage for the first two SLS flights. For 
example, if the Core Stage Flight Computers have internal 
software failures, or fail too many strings of its redundant 
hardware, then they will be unable to control the vehicle and 
hence the MPCV must abort. Other potential triggers include 
detection of loss of control from the Guidance, Navigation, and 
Control System, of thrust vector control system gimbal angles, 
liquid oxygen tank and liquid hydrogen tank pressures, etc. 
These potential triggers are identified by considering the 
consequences of failure of the various boxes, with respect to 
ultimate crew safety on the MPCV. 
One tool used to identify candidate abort triggers and to 
determine their coverage against mission and crew safety goals 
is the Goal-Function Tree (GFT). This representation provides 
a hierarchical representation of system goals and functions 
rigorously modeled using state variables. It enables a top-down 
assessment of the coverage of FM mechanisms to detect 
failures that can compromise system goals. For every goal that 
must be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved. 
If it is critical to take action if the goal is not achieved, then the 
system designer can place a failure detection at that point. In 
turn, this detection can activate a failure response. By 
reviewing the impact of failure along all paths up the GFT, the 
FM engineer can design a suite of failure detections that ensure 
that all paths up the GFT are covered, and can provide 
preliminary information regarding how much warning time 
they provide for a response to be activated compared to the 
failure effects they are attempting to mitigate. For SLS, the 
GFT was used to assess the coverage and physical relationships 
of abort triggers. These relationships include understanding of 
whether two or more triggers existed along any given GFT 
path, which means that more than one trigger can detect failure 
effects for a given Loss of Mission scenario [2]. 
Once identified and described, these candidate abort 
triggers must be evaluated to determine if they provide 
sufficient benefit to crew safety to warrant inclusion in the SLS 
design. The evaluation process is based on the understanding of 
the launch vehicle risks through past failures, various design 
and safety analyses, such as GN&C controllability, Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard Analysis, 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and/or engineering 
judgment, and trades between technical capability, schedule, 
cost, benefit and risks. Because it is not technically and 
financially feasible to monitor all possible failure modes and to 
implement all abort triggers, a Risk-Informed Decision Making 
(RIDM) process, which is part of NASA’s System Engineering 
Process, is implemented to emphasize the proper use of risk 
analysis in its broadest sense to make risk-informed decisions 
[3]. This is not new for NASA, or for engineering more 
generally. However, the quantitative analysis described in this 
paper to perform risk-informed decision-making involves 
several more engineering organizations in a comprehensive, in-
depth quantitative analysis of Fault Management than has been 
performed to date. 
B. Abort Trigger Relationships to Redundancy Management, 
Safing, and Caution & Warning 
In abort scenarios, frequently several other FM actions also 
occur. These include safing actions, Redundancy Management 
actions, and Caution & Warning notifications. 
For any launch vehicle, history shows that the highest 
probability failures are those related to its propulsion system. 
For SLS, this includes the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen 
tanks, the plumbing to move the propellants to the liquid 
propellant engines, and the turbopumps, propellant injection, 
and combustion. However, liquid propellant engines have a 
major safety advantage compared to solid rocket motors insofar 
as they can be shut down. As previously stated, the SLS CSE, 
have the capability to detect failures and respond by shutting 
them down, i.e. engine redlines protections.  
The CSE shutdown response is a so-called “safing” 
response. In general, safing is defined as an action to change 
system configuration, state, or goals to protect humans or 
assets. A CSE shutdown clearly fits the definition, as it changes 
the system configuration by removing failed CSEs from use, 
and in doing so it prevents an uncontained engine failure that 
protects the rest of the launch vehicle and the MPCV. In short, 
a shutdown, if successful, potentially prevents a catastrophic 
explosion.  
For the SLS, if two or more CSEs shut down, the launch 
vehicle will either be unable to perform attitude control, or the 
launch vehicle will be unable to boost the MPCV to the desired 
orbit. In either event, an abort will be necessary. If only one 
CSE is shut down, then except for scenarios in which the 
shutdown occurs near the start of ascent, the launch vehicle can 
generally maintain control and the MPCV can reach orbit. 
From an analysis viewpoint, single engine shutdowns early in 
the mission, and multiple engine shutdowns are abort 
conditions. Single engine shutdowns, if they occur in the 
middle or end of the ascent, are not abort conditions because 
the MPCV remains safe and the MPCV can achieve nominal 
orbit. When a single engine shutdown is early in the mission 
and orbit cannot be achieved, the SLS sends a warning message 
to the MPCV, which signifies that an abort will be needed, but 
not immediately. If two or more engines shut down, then abort 
will be needed immediately and an abort recommendation is 
sent. For the purposes of analysis, the probability of successful 
CSE detection and shutdown is an important factor in the 
overall assessment of SLS aborts triggers. 
CSE shutdowns are not the only potential safing actions for 
the SLS. During ascent, there are failure modes that result in 
the inability for one of the boosters to separate. If this occurs, it 
may be desirable to prevent both boosters from separating, as 
the launch vehicle is far more stable with two boosters 
remaining on the vehicle than only one. Prior to launch, there 
are a variety of safing actions that can occur, to prevent 
hazardous events from occurring. These will not be discussed 
in this paper, as these do not result in aborts. 
Redundancy Management (RM) also plays a significant 
role in the analysis of abort triggers. This is because successful 
RM actions enable the mission to continue to successful 
completion. For example, if one of the three Core Stage (CS) 
Flight Computers (FC) fails, the RM action will remove the 
failed FC from the redundant suite, enabling the remaining two 
FCs to continue the mission. If one of the remaining two FCs 
fail, then the SLS will send an abort recommendation, because 
the ascent can no longer be continued safely. 
Analytically, the successful RM response to a failure of one 
of three CS FCs is accounted for through a probabilistic 
estimate of the reliability of the redundant FC suite. If two of 
three FCs fail, this results in a LOM and consequent abort. If 
only one of the three fails, then the mission continues and no 
LOM results. Abort triggers come into play only if a LOM 
occurs, including False Positives of the abort triggers in a 
mission that otherwise would have succeeded and never when 
the mission continues successfully. 
Finally, Caution & Warning (C&W) notifications are 
another aspect of the design worthy of mention. As described 
above, abort conditions that do not require an immediate abort 
are implemented as warning messages. Caution messages are 
sent from the SLS to the MPCV when a failure occurs that 
degrades SLS safety margins. Examples of this include the 
failure of a single CS FC of the suite of three FCs described 
above, or a propellant tank pressure that is higher or lower than 
expected, but not yet reaching safety margins that necessitate 
an abort. Warning messages and resultant non-immediate 
aborts must be accounted for in the analysis of abort triggers. 
Caution messages are only indirectly assessed insofar as they 
are related to the RM actions described above, which affect 
reliability of redundant component suites, and hence the 
calculation of LOM probabilities. 
C. Abort Trigger Quantitative Metrics: LOC Benefit 
As described in the Introduction, FM is implemented as a 
suite of control loops that monitor state variables, determine if 
the states of these state variables indicate current or future 
failure, determine the location of the failure cause (isolation), 
decide on appropriate responses, and then execute these 
responses. Quantitative metrics that enable assessment of FM 
performance relate to these functions. While in general we can 
divide FM metrics into state estimation and state control 
metrics, the specifics of the metrics must be tailored to the 
application.  
Since FM exists to preserve system functionality that 
achieve system goals, the designer must determine the goals 
and functions of the system that any given FM design is 
intended to protect. A given FM control loop might protect all 
of the top-level system goals, or it might protect some subset of 
the top-level goals or lower level goals. For example, for a real-
time triplex voting computer system, the triplex voting (which 
detects a computer that is providing incorrect data and removes 
that data and/or the failed computer from use) preserves the 
system’s computing functions, which usually exist to support 
higher-level system goals. 
Since abort triggers exist to protect the crew, for a human-
rated launch vehicle such as SLS, the highest-level metric or 
measure of value of an abort trigger is the probability that the 
abort trigger and the resulting abort response enable the crew to 
escape the hazard and return to Earth. If no abort trigger exists 
to detect an abort condition, then the MPCV and crew will not 
escape the hazard or return to Earth. The abort triggers could be 
on the SLS, on the MPCV, with launch or mission operations 
on the ground, or could even be the crew itself. If an abort 
condition exists, an abort response must be taken, and this 
cannot occur unless the abort condition is detected, which is the 
purpose of an abort trigger. The value of the abort trigger in the 
analysis methodology described in this paper is measured as a 
Loss of Crew (LOC) probability per mission. To be precise, the 
measure of an abort trigger value is called “Loss of Crew 
Benefit”, or LOC Benefit, which is the per-mission probability 
that a given abort trigger saves the crew. In the NASA SLS 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), LOC Benefit is 
sometimes called “Abortable LOM,” the per-mission 
probability that a LOM can be successfully ‘aborted.’ 
For LOC Benefit to be estimated, the abort trigger must 
detect the failure, which estimates the state (i.e. does an abort 
condition exist), and the abort response must succeed in 
removing the MPCV and crew from the hazard. Metrics are 
required for both, which follows the general rule that FM 
metrics are necessary for state estimation and state control. 
State estimation determines the current or future existence of 
the failure, and isolates (determines) the location of the failure 
to the necessary level of granularity. State control consists of 
deciding what response to take, and the effectiveness of the 
response. Between them, the state estimation and state control 
metrics must combine to calculate the LOC Benefit number. 
State estimation metrics are based on the quad of True 
Positive, True Negative, False Positive, and False Negative. 
These are defined here. 
 False Negative: An incorrect decision that a 
condition does not exist, when it actually does exist. 
 False Positive: An incorrect decision that a condition 
exists, when it actually does not exist. 
 True Negative: A correct decision that a condition 
does not exist, when it actually does not exist. 
 True Positive: A correct decision that a condition 
exists, when it actually does exist. 
 
For detection of abort conditions, the condition to which 
these definitions refer is not merely a failure, but a failure 
whose current or later effects will threaten the crew and require 
an abort response. Each of these metrics is specified as a 
probability. For False Positives, it is specified as a false 
positive probability per mission. For False Negatives, it is 
specified as a false negative probability per failure occurrence. 
True Positives and Negatives work similarly: a True Positive is 
specified per failure occurrence, and True Negative is specified 
per mission. 
The next part of state estimation is fault diagnosis, which 
includes both fault isolation and fault identification. The former 
refers to determining the location of the cause of the detected 
failure effects, with a specified level of granularity. The latter 
refers to the specific failure mode or cause of the detected 
failure effects. For the on-board and immediate purpose of 
enabling the crew to escape from safety-critical hazards, 
identifying the cause of the crew-threatening hazard is 
unimportant, though it will matter for the post-flight failure 
investigation. Determining the location of the failure cause is 
also unimportant, as it only matters that the failure effects are 
somewhere on the launch vehicle. Once again, for post-flight 
analysis, it will be important to determining the location of the 
failure causes. Though fault diagnosis is a critical part of FM in 
general, for the purposes of abort trigger analysis it is not a 
significant issue and thus will not be discussed any further in 
this paper. 
The next metric of potential relevance is the correctness of 
the selection of which response to take. In the case of abort 
conditions and triggers, during launch vehicle ascent there are 
only two possible responses:  to abort immediately, or to abort 
eventually. From an implementation standpoint, the SLS 
distinguishes these two possibilities. For situations that require 
an immediate abort, the SLS sends an abort recommendation. 
For situations in which the abort does not need to be taken 
immediately, the SLS sends a warning message to the MPCV. 
Both of these cases are pre-determined before flight, and if the 
selection decision between these two responses is incorrect, it 
is incorrect in the design and analysis of the abort triggers. 
The final metric of importance is the effectiveness of the 
abort response. In these cases, there are several factors 
involved. The first is the speed of failure effect propagations, 
which include failure effect propagations internal to the 
vehicle, and the propagations external to the vehicle, such as 
explosion overpressure, fireball, and debris. The second is the 
amount of warning time that the abort triggers provide. If more 
warning time is provided, then the MPCV has more time to 
escape the hazardous environment. The third is the criticality of 
these effects.  
For explosion dynamics that consist of the three major 
factors of overpressure, fireball, and debris, the criticality of the 
impact to the crew can vary significantly over the course of 
ascent. During ascent, ambient air pressure, velocity through 
the atmosphere, and dynamic pressure vary greatly, as does the 
amount of propellant remaining in the launch vehicle. One of 
the most significant factors is the amount of debris generated in 
an explosion. In general, larger explosions resulting in more 
debris occur lower in the atmosphere. In turn, more debris 
means a larger probability of this debris striking the MPCV and 
causing LOC. Conversely, as the launch vehicle reaches very 
high altitude, much less debris is generated, and the MPCV can 
frequently survive the blast even if it has not escaped the 
hazardous environment, simply because no debris hits it. 
All of these metrics are combined to generate the LOC 
Benefit for an abort trigger. The LOC Benefit is the measure of 
the value of the entire FM Control Loop in which the abort 
trigger resides. However, for every abort trigger added to the 
system, there is the possibility of a False Positive, in which the 
abort trigger erroneously determines that an abort condition 
exists and sends an abort recommendation leading to an abort. 
This produces an added probability of LOM, and is an inherent 
cost of an abort trigger. In addition, since every abort response 
can fail causing LOC, there is also a small added probability of 
LOC for every abort caused by a False Positive abort 
recommendation. This too must be accounted for in the overall 
calculation of the LOC Benefit, in which the False Positive 
LOC probability must be subtracted from the LOC Benefit of 
successful crew survival based on the existence of the abort 
trigger. 
D. The Value of the LOC Benefit Calculation 
The calculation of LOC Benefit, compared to the LOM and 
LOC costs is a means of performing quantitative analysis of the 
value of abort triggers, or more generally, of the value of Fault 
Management and of System Health Management for a given 
system. The theory of SHM clearly indicates that as an 
extension of classical and robust control theory, the 
performance of FM Control Loops can be assessed in ways 
similar to classical control loops, and using similar metrics of 
state estimation and control. However, because the purpose of 
SHM and of FM is to mitigate potential, impending, and actual 
failure, the benefits of SHM/FM must account for the 
probability of failure. If a system were perfectly reliable at 
acceptable cost with a single-string design, no redundancy and 
no FM would be necessary. However, in practice few if any 
large-scale, complex systems are sufficiently reliable in this 
way, which makes FM necessary. Thus assessing the value and 
performance of FM requires estimation of the probability that 
failures will impact the system’s goals [1]. 
Estimating the probability of failure requires methods of 
reliability theory, PRA, and more generally, of risk-informed 
design. In addition to classical methods of estimating reliability 
of components, other sources of faults, such as common cause 
failure, human reliability or human error, and software faults 
are all needed to estimate the probability of failure of hardware, 
software, and humans. Since FM is implemented through FM 
Control Loops (FMCL) that mitigate the effects of failure, the 
value of these FMCLs inherently depends on the probability of 
the failures that they mitigate. Abort triggers necessarily exist 
to mitigate risks to the safety of the crew, which is only a 
subset of the failures that can occur in a human-rated launch 
vehicle. The different kinds of hazards to the crew (whether on 
the ground or on-board the MPCV) that can occur, and the 
probability with which these occur, must therefore be 
estimated. 
The LOC Benefit value for an abort trigger in a launch 
vehicle, and also similar “benefit” calculations that can be 
performed for other systems for reliability, availability, or 
safety, is only useful in a comparative sense. For human-rated 
launch vehicles, abort triggers are useful only in situations in 
which the required orbit or mission success cannot be achieved 
and an abort will be required now or in the future. For the sake 
of argument, assume that the probability of achieving orbit is 
90%, which equates to a LOM probability of 10%. If no abort 
action occurs, these LOM cases will result in Loss of Crew. 
Further, assume that the LOC requirement is set at 1% per 
mission. This means that the abort triggers and abort responses 
must reduce the LOC from 10% down to 1% or below. The 
difference between these values is the required amount of LOC 
Benefit that must be provided. Abort triggers are worthwhile 
only if they provide “significant” value in driving LOC down 
to the required level. 
To these dependability-centered metrics one can also 
estimate other costs, such as the actual monetary and schedule 
costs. These non-dependability costs are not addressed in this 
paper, but of course are important for this and all other 
applications. However, these can be estimated in standard ways 
that do not require further elaboration here. 
III. SLS ABORT TRIGGER ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the analysis process used to assess 
the value of abort triggers on SLS for the program’s 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and one post-PDR cycle of 
analysis. 
A. Abort Trigger Analysis Overview 
The SLS Abort Trigger Analysis can be generalized into the 
following seven major steps.  
 Step One. Identify abort triggers to be assessed and 
insert into the Abort Analysis Matrix (AAM) 
spreadsheet. 
 Step Two. Obtain the list of LOM scenarios, which is 
a combination of the mission phase, failure scenario, 
and LOM Environment (LOME), modeled by the 
PRA group.  
 Step Three. For each LOM scenario, examine the 
associated PRA minimum cut sets to determine which 
abort triggers can detect the failure effects modeled in 
this LOM scenario as primary or secondary 
detections. 
 Step Four. For each LOM scenario and trigger 
identified in Step Three, estimate the percent coverage 
of the LOM risk for each abort trigger based on 
associated minimum cut sets, and the corresponding 
minimum, mode and maximum Abortability Table 
Warning Time (ATWT) estimates. 
 Step Five. Based on the LOM scenario’s contributing 
failure scenario and LOME, identify which 
abortability table or tables to be used for the abort 
effectiveness (AE) value lookup, or specify manual 
AE inputs.  
 Step Six. Execute AE lookup Front End Excel Visual 
Basic for Application (VBA) Macro to populate AE 
into the AAM. 
 Step Seven. Format output results for PRA use. 
B. Loss of Mission Scenario Identification 
For abort trigger analysis, the only failures that are relevant 
are those that threaten the MPCV and crew. As described 
above, whether these are immediate threats due to a vehicle 
that is breaking up or losing control, or whether the vehicle is 
stable but cannot boost the MPCV into the required orbit, the 
mission is lost. Therefore the failure scenarios that require 
aborts are always Loss of Mission scenarios. Determining the 
effectiveness and value of abort triggers requires estimation of 
the effectiveness of these triggers in all LOM scenarios. This in 
turn implies that all LOM scenarios must be identified. 
In general, failure scenarios describe unique failure 
behaviors, with a unique set of failure responses, with a 
specific system configuration over a specified time period. In 
the SLS abort trigger analysis, LOM scenarios specify a unique 
set of failure behaviors with a specific system configuration 
over a specified time period. However, in these LOM 
scenarios, more than one abort trigger could be activated first. 
Since only one abort trigger can send an abort recommendation 
for an abort response to occur, it only matters which abort 
trigger detects the abort condition first and issues the abort 
recommendation (or for non-immediate aborts, the warning 
message). If the first abort trigger that could potentially detect 
the abort condition fails to do so, it is usually true that another 
abort trigger will detect a later, “downstream” failure effect, 
which is also necessarily an abort condition. The analysis 
methodology maps all abort triggers that can potentially detect 
the failure behaviors in a LOM scenario, so LOM scenarios 
themselves don’t need to define all possible abort triggers that 
can be activated. It only needs to define the behaviors 
themselves, and then the abort triggers are mapped into the 
LOM scenario. In an actual operational event, only one of these 
abort triggers will be the one that activates first, and this 
defines an “abort scenario.” Thus within a LOM scenario there 
are several possible abort scenarios, depending on which abort 
trigger detects the abort condition first. 
As described in the previous major section, the Goal-
Function Tree provides a method to identify potential abort 
triggers and understand their relationships to each other. The 
reason that the GFT aids this understanding is that every path 
in the GFT represents not only a set of needed goals and 
functions, but also the failure behaviors that will occur in a 
specific failure scenario when a goal cannot be achieved. 
Therefore the GFT can be used as a starting point to define 
failure scenarios for a given system [2]. Those failure scenarios 
that lead to direct threats to the crew or to inability to achieve 
orbit are the ones that must be identified. 
For SLS, LOM scenarios were defined in an iterative 
process that started on the NASA Constellation program and 
Ares I project going back to 2005. This process involved 
several groups, including Mission and Fault Management 
(M&FM), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) PRA, 
Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C), and Structures and 
Environments (STE). It took several years to work through 
several iterations of understanding about how to define failure 
scenarios, what level of detail is needed, and what the criteria 
were. When the Ares I Project and Constellation Program were 
cancelled in 2010, the transition to what became the SLS 
program enabled another reassessment of the criteria and 
modeling of failure scenarios needed to perform abort trigger 
analysis, leading to the criteria defined here. In sum, this was a 
multi-year, multi-organization iterative process, leading 
ultimately to the proper set of criteria that enabled the 
quantitative analysis described here.  
We now know that we can use the GFT representation and 
analyses, as well as the PRA and Hazard cause tree models to 
help define the needed LOM scenarios, and with the experience 
of having done the abort trigger analyses, the proper level is 
now understood. Preferably, the LOM scenarios must be 
defined to the level necessary to map the abort triggers into the 
unique set of failure effects over relevant ascent time periods. 
These time periods include not just unique vehicle 
configurations, but also differing external environments at 
different altitudes, velocities, and pressures.  
C. Loss of Mission Scenario Probability Estimation  
Once a set of LOM scenarios are identified and agreed to 
by the SLS abort analysis team, the S&MA PRA group 
quantifies the model based upon NASA PRA Procedures Guide 
for NASA Managers and Practitioners [4] and NASA Cross-
Program PRA and SLS PRA Plans, and best industry practices. 
A PRA model is a logic model that represents a failure scenario 
or failure outcome for a system. For SLS, fault trees are being 
developed by the SLS S&MA PRA group to assess SLS LOM 
scenarios. The PRA fault tree is an integrated risk model 
representing the SLS LOM probability during flight by 
modeling system and component failure modes and 
dependencies from a LOM failure scenario’s point of view. 
Once the fault tree models are completed, the models are 
populated with failure data in order to quantify the risks. 
PRA uses various fault tree basic events quantification 
techniques depending on the failure mode, design maturity, and 
availability of data. Without going into specifics, typical SLS 
PRA data are grouped into the following general cases: 
functional failure, common cause failure, phenomenological 
failure, external causes, and process or manufacturing errors. 
Detailed descriptions for the various NASA PRA data classes 
can be found in NASA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers 
and Practitioners [4]. Although SLS is still in the design phase, 
the majority of the hardware used is Shuttle heritage or derived, 
or commercial off the shelf, where significant amount of 
reliability data exists. In situations where flight and test data is 
not available, reliability prediction values from similarity 
analysis, similar components, handbook data, and/or domain 
expert judgments are used to initially estimate the risks. The 
results from the SLS PRA model are in the form of fault tree 
minimum cut sets. 
A cut set can be interpreted as a “failure scenario” that 
consists of a single failure or combination of failures that are 
assumed to result in a LOM. A cut set is said to be minimum if 
it cannot be Boolean-reduced further. Automatically generated 
by the PRA software, each minimum cut set includes a 
description of the event or events involved with the 
corresponding probabilities for a specific mission time. By 
default, the probability estimates represent the mean failure 
probability for each minimum cut set.  
The LOM minimum cut sets and their associated 
probabilities are used in the AAM to understand the specific 
failure causations for a given LOM scenario, which is 
composed of the combination of mission phase, failure 
scenario and LOME. If the basic events’ probability estimates 
contain uncertainty, then a Monte Carlo simulation can be 
used to estimate uncertainty around the mean likelihood 
estimates. The uncertainty analysis provides another crucial 
piece of information to allow for risk-informed decision 
making by understanding the probability intervals or 
“probabilistic estimate variability” for each failure scenario or 
effectiveness of specific design changes, such as hardware 
redundancy, FM protocols and abort triggers [3]. Further, 
because uncertainty analysis is required for NASA Cross-
Program PRA (the PRA organization and model including 
SLS, MPCV, Ground Systems, and Mission Operations) [6], 
the SLS AE estimates generated by SLS M&FM group 
contain uncertainties, which will be described later. Currently, 
the AE uncertainty is only applied to the mean estimates of the 
LOM scenarios provided by the PRA group. For SLS Critical 
Design Review, integration of the AE and LOM scenario 
uncertainties will be implemented to better understand and 
communicate the uncertainty for the AE and LOC benefit 
estimates.  
D. Failure Detection and Confirmation – False Positives and 
False Negatives 
Abort triggers are failure detection mechanisms, and as 
described in section II.C above, they are assessed using False 
Positive (FP) / False Negative (FN) / True Positive (TP) / True 
Negative (TN) metrics. A desirable abort trigger has low FP 
and low FN rates, and conversely high TP and high TN rates. 
FP and FN are logical complements to TP and TN, and on SLS 
the calculations are performed for FP/FN. 
For SLS, abort triggers are generally designed to use 
redundant measurements so as to minimize the possibility that 
a failure in the measurements from one string of hardware will 
not lead to an abort based on a sensor or measurement failure. 
That is, redundant measurements are used to reduce the false 
positive rate. The way this is phrased on SLS is that there is a 
“detection” and a “confirmation”. This means that an abort 
trigger requires two measurements that indicate an abort 
condition exists. 
Calculation of FP/FN for a given abort trigger requires the 
application of reliability theory for redundant suites of 
hardware components and for common mode failures, and the 
physics-based assessment of threshold values for triggers that 
monitor continuous state variables. Failure of components that 
are involved with a given abort trigger, which include sensors, 
data buses, computers, and software algorithms are assessed in 
the usual way according to classical reliability theory, with two 
significant additions. First, the calculation needs to estimate the 
probability that component failures lead to an FP or FN, and 
incorporate them into the modified traditional reliability 
equations. Second, which is an issue of particular relevance for 
abort triggers, is the need to model and assess the effectiveness 
of “sensor data qualification” (SDQ). SDQ determines whether 
the information being used by the decision algorithm is valid, 
and hence it inherently reduces the possibility of false positives 
and false negatives. Because SDQ exists to reduce FPs and 
FNs, the effectiveness of the SDQ must itself be modeled. In 
other words, it is insufficient to build a typical, simple 
reliability block diagram. The models used to estimate the 
effectiveness of abort triggers must include detailed models of 
SDQ, to determine if the SDQ routines are providing sufficient 
value to be worthwhile to develop. Finally, the FP/FN 
calculation must also assess the common cause failure rates, as 
it typically happens that when the reliability of redundant 
strings of components is assessed, the dominant factor will be 
the common cause failure rates of hardware and software (or of 
humans, if part of the trigger design). 
The other major factor in the calculation of the FP/FN of 
abort triggers is the assessment and determination of where to 
set the threshold values that distinguish the difference between 
nominal and failed behavior. For measurements of binary state 
variables, such as whether a bit is set to a 1 or 0, threshold 
values do not matter. However, for continuous variables such 
as pressure, temperature, position, or attitude (angular 
direction), it is essential to specify a threshold that 
differentiates between nominal and failed behavior. In general, 
there is no single threshold value that inherently distinguishes 
nominal from failed behavior. Rather, there is often a range of 
values that can occur when the system is in a nominal or failed 
state. Within this range, setting the threshold to guarantee 
detection of the failure (having a near 0% false negative rate) 
will be susceptible to a high false positive rate, in which the 
detection indicates that a failure exists, when in fact there is no 
failure. Conversely, trying to minimize the false positive rate 
will generally increase the false negative rate. 
In cases where the overlap between nominal and failure 
behaviors overlaps a great deal, that is, when small changes to 
FP create large changes to FN or vice versa, then it may be 
advisable to not use that state variable for failure detection 
purposes, and conversely to monitor some other state variable 
instead. In this case, the other state variable to be monitored 
may have larger separation between nominal and failed 
behaviors. Or it may be that the original state variable can be 
monitored, but additional state variables must also be 
monitored to provide more information to distinguish nominal 
from failed behaviors. 
In any event, determining where to set the threshold is a 
system-specific decision. Where failure cannot be tolerated, but 
false positive rates are acceptable, then the threshold can be set 
to provide a near guarantee that the failure will be detected, but 
at the cost of potentially higher false positive rates. Or the 
system may be biased to minimize false positives, in which 
case there will be a greater chance that a failure will occur that 
will not be detected. 
It should also be noted that changing the threshold values 
does not determine simply whether failure is detected or not, 
but rather is often a case of when the failure is detected. It is 
often true that a failure causes an ever-increasing or decreasing 
value of the state variable, which will diverge further from 
nominal behavior over time. Thus biasing the threshold to 
reduce false positive rates often has the effect of delaying when 
the detection occurs, as opposed to reducing the probability of 
detection as a whole. If there is sufficient time for the system to 
recover from the failure, or in the case of the SLS, for the crew 
to escape the threat, then it may be possible to set the threshold 
to reduce false positives, yet still provide a reasonable amount 
of time for the crew to escape. 
For the case of a human-rated launch vehicle, it is not 
inherently obvious which bias should be used. On one hand, 
setting the threshold to protect human life is crucial to provide 
astronauts a means to escape a current or impending threat to 
their safety. On the other hand, for a heavy-lift, deep space-
capable vehicle such as SLS that will cost perhaps up to a 
billion dollars per flight, aborting a mission that could have 
succeeded is a tremendously expensive decision that could 
even jeopardize the program. To date, astronauts have accepted 
the high risks of space flight, and so the philosophy for setting 
abort trigger thresholds is not biased towards crew safety so as 
to create a large risk of false positives and unnecessary aborts. 
The discussion about the appropriate balance remains an 
ongoing debate, but it is clear that having a high false positive 
rate is not acceptable, just as having high risks to the crew is 
also unacceptable. The relative impact of changing threshold 
values on crew escape times is a large factor in the threshold 
design. 
E.  Crew Survivability - Explosion Dynamics  
When a launch vehicle’s energetic system, such as solid 
rocket motors or liquid propellant engines experience an 
uncontained failure, the failure effects can propagate to the 
surrounding system and lead to potential detonation of the core 
stage. This explosion is the primary source of hazards to crew 
survivability during an abort by generating blast overpressure 
wave, fireball, and debris/fragmentation field toward the 
escaping crew module [5].  
The severity of these hazards on the crew module depends 
on several variables that must be accounted for in the abort 
analysis. These variables are: nature and severity of the launch 
vehicle failure; failure propagation from element failure to 
vehicle explosion; vehicle and launch abort vehicle trajectories; 
design of the crew capsule and launch escape system (such as 
structural strength); propagation of the explosion dynamics to 
the crew capsule; abort warning time provided by the launch 
vehicle abort trigger; and attitude of the crew capsule when the 
hazards reach it [5]. To ensure consistency and traceability in 
the SLS and MPCV abort analyses, the design capability of the 
crew module to withstand aforementioned crew threatening 
explosion hazards are described in a set of MPCV abort 
environments table limits that are also being used as design 
requirements for SLS to meet either by design or analysis. 
SLS STE group is responsible for modeling interactions of 
SLS element explosion dynamics, starting from characterizing 
the potential impact of the initial failure manifestation or 
LOME, and their abort environments against MPCV launch 
abort vehicle and its vulnerabilities. This entails the analysis of 
the likelihood that a failure producing a given LOME will 
propagate to other elements and ultimately to vehicle 
explosion, and the impact on the MPCV structure. The list of 
LOMEs is generated through discussions with SLS PRA and 
M&FM personnel with the objective of providing complete 
coverage of possible failure outcomes at a level of refinement 
sufficient to enable the identification of leading crew risks and 
effective mitigation strategies. The LOMEs include Core Stage 
(CS) engine explosion, booster burst, pad explosion, CS 
external explosion, and CS intertank internal explosion.  
STE develops abortability tables as functions of mission 
phase and available warning time by integrating the effects of 
failure propagation with characterizations of the environment 
severity. The environment severity is developed by integrating 
characterizations of the failure environment initiation and 
propagation with MPCV abort trajectories and vulnerabilities. 
Results are time-averaged across mission phases, with results 
for each phase provided as functions of warning time in rows 
that are identified by the Mission Event Time at the midpoint 
of the associated mission phase. For SLS PDR, twelve 
abortability tables were generated. Each abortability table is 
contained within a separate Excel workbook, and each 
workbook contains three worksheets labeled Best, Worst, and 
Base representing the three types of modeling and failure 
propagation assumptions. Best case assumptions typically show 
higher levels of abortability resulting from the use of more 
optimistic assumptions regarding propagation and the 
application of more benign explosion environments. The 
lowest levels of abortability, typically shown in the Worst 
sheet, result from pessimistic assumptions regarding both 
propagation and environment severity. The abortability values 
in the Base sheet result from most likely estimates of 
propagation and environments, with some remaining 
conservative bias.  
For use with SLS PRA, each AE “estimate” is composed of 
three values: worst, base and best assumptions, and for 
explosion cases these are extracted from the STE abortability 
tables based on the ATWT estimated by M&FM for each LOM 
scenario based on a worst-on-worst, base-on-base and best-on-
best type of bounding analysis. That is, the worst AE is based 
on the shortest abort warning time with the worst case 
abortability table. Best AE corresponds to longest abort 
warning time with best case abortability table, and Base AE 
corresponds to median abort warning time.  
F. Crew Survivability - Loss of Control 
Another typical kind of threat to the crew is when the SLS 
vehicle is unable to maintain control. In general this means that 
its attitudes (the direction that it is pointed) and attitude rates 
(the rate of change of pointing direction) diverge from nominal 
such that the vehicle will not achieve orbit, or threaten SLS or 
MPCV structural load limits, hence causing a “structural 
demise.” Assessing the SLS vehicle’s ability to control the 
vehicle’s attitudes and rates, and the guidance to achieve orbit 
is the job of the SLS Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
(GN&C) group. This group performs typical launch vehicle 
GN&C analyses using physics-based Monte Carlo simulations 
and stability analyses. For the SLS, it also performs analyses of 
the GN&C subsystem’s ability to detect failures to control 
through detecting diverging attitude errors and rate errors. 
For SLS abort trigger analysis, GN&C uses the same kinds 
of physics-based, Monte Carlo methods as it uses for typical 
“nominal” guidance and control analyses. These methods are 
supplemented by modeling hypothetical abort triggers that 
monitor attitude and rate errors and other GN&C state variables 
as appropriate, with corresponding hypothetical thresholds. As 
described in Section D above, the threshold values are set 
based on assumed requirements for False Positive and False 
Negative rates, and analyzed against a variety of failures whose 
effects manifest themselves in GN&C state variables. Since 
these thresholds are set based on the needed FP and FN rates, 
and against SLS and MPCV structural limits and orbital 
performance metrics, the GN&C abort triggers are generally 
effective in detecting failures that manifest themselves through 
attitude and rate errors before a structural demise and explosion 
occurs. Abort responses are usually able to enable the MPCV 
to escape the resulting explosion, at least when the Launch 
Abort System is available. 
Additionally, GN&C abort triggers provide a secondary 
benefit of detecting some situations in which the vehicle 
structure has collapsed or when an explosion has occurred. 
While not designed specifically to address these cases, if the 
SLS CS Flight Computers remain active and are not yet 
destroyed by an explosion, the GN&C abort triggers can detect 
that an explosion has occurred, causing the vehicle to lose 
control. In these cases the GN&C abort triggers do not provide 
much warning time, because the explosion is already occurring 
before the crew will be able to activate an abort response. 
G. Crew Survivability – Benign Scenarios 
When a failure occurs that does not result in an immediate 
launch vehicle explosion or loss control, and the launch vehicle 
continues a stable, controllable flight, the LOM scenario is said 
to be benign. One example of a benign LOM scenario is an 
abort resulting from a false positive detection from an abort 
trigger. In this case, the MPCV aborts off a perfectly fine 
launch vehicle that is flying in a nominal trajectory. Another 
benign LOM scenario is the shutdown of a single CS engine , 
or “single engine out” that requires an abort at some point later 
in the flight. For SLS PDR, it was assumed that for benign 
LOM scenarios, the AE value, as confirmed by SLS STE 
group’s abort dynamics analysis, is assumed to be 100% off the 
SLS vehicle. That is, there are no threats from SLS that will 
impede crew capsule abort.  
Even if the SLS poses no threat in benign scenarios, this 
does not mean that the abort has no risks at all. There are 
always risks due to MPCV/crew capsule failures such as the 
Launch Abort System (LAS) not firing or a failure to deploy 
parachutes. These risks are captured in the Cross-Program PRA 
where successful crew capsule abort off SLS are linked to 
appropriate MPCV abort models that include both failure of the 
MPCV abort system and physical abort environment.  
H. Abort Analysis Matrix 
The Abort Analysis Matrix (AAM) is an Excel spreadsheet 
that implements the M&FM group’s model of SLS abort 
trigger effectiveness. It uses the LOM scenarios provided by 
PRA group and their associated probabilities, delineated by 
vehicle mission phase. In the AAM’s M&FM Input sheet/tab, 
each row represents a LOM scenario, that is, a specific 
combination of the FS, LOME and mission phase. AAM 
columns represent candidate abort triggers to be assessed. This 
format allows for all candidate abort triggers to be assessed for 
their value in each LOM scenario.  
Each abort trigger entry in the AAM consists of five sub 
headers. The first sub header consists of four columns that 
define the performance characteristics of the trigger when 
activated in a given LOM scenario. They are: 
 Trigger Detection Class: Indicates if the trigger will be 
the first one to detect the failure behaviors in the LOM 
scenario (i.e. Primary) or if the trigger will detect the 
failure behaviors only after a primary trigger fails to 
detect the scenario failure behaviors (i.e. Secondary) 
 False Negative: A percentage of the time that the 
trigger will not detect the failure behavior in the LOM 
scenario.  
o For Primary triggers, any FN probability will 
be potentially detected by a Secondary 
trigger, or if there is no Secondary trigger, it is 
assumed that the remaining probability will 
lead to LOC. 
o For Secondary triggers, it is assumed that 
any FN probability will lead to LOC. Any 
possible Tertiary triggers are ignored as 
having extremely low probability. 
 Trigger Probabilistic Split: A percentage that indicates 
the portion of the LOM scenario probability that can be 
picked up or monitored by this specific trigger relative 
to other abort triggers in its trigger detection class. That 
is, the trigger probability splits for a primary trigger are 
associated only with other primary triggers, and 
secondary triggers only with other secondary triggers. 
As an example, if two triggers A and B are primary, 
and C is secondary, then a 60/40 split of A to B means 
that 60% of the given LOM scenario probability will 
be detected first by A, and 40% by B. Only false 
negative probabilities of A and B are potentially 
detected by C, which captures 100% of the FN 
probabilities of A and B. 
 ATWT Uncertainty Distribution Type: Uncertainty 
distribution associated with estimated ATWT inputted. 
This is used to determine the mean of ATWT from the 
inputted Min, Mode and Max values, and for future 
Monte Carlo simulation.   
The remaining four sub headers delineate probabilistic 
distribution attributes associated with the trigger. Each sub 
header, titled Minimum (Worst Case), Mode (Most Probable 
Case), Maximum (Best Case), and Mean (Average Case), have 
two columns, ATWT and AE.  
With the format of the matrix defined, with the LOM 
scenario data as rows in the matrix and the abort triggers and 
their associated parameters as columns, the process of filling in 
the matrix can begin. The first step is to analyze each LOM 
scenario to determine which of the triggers will detect it first. If 
a trigger can directly detect the results of a LOM scenario then 
it is set as a Primary trigger by placing an “X” in the field that 
matches up with that trigger’s Trigger Detection Class field 
and the LOM scenario that is being analyzed. If multiple 
triggers can act as Primaries, then it is necessary to allocate a 
certain percentage of the specific LOM scenario probability to 
each of them. This allocation is based on an M&FM 
assessment of the failure causes modeled in the specific LOM 
scenario to determine what fraction of the resulting effects 
could be picked up by the trigger. In the current structure of the 
AAM, it is not possible for a primary trigger to act as 
secondary. It was discovered later in the analysis that there are 
some cases where a trigger could potentially be a primary or a 
secondary. This issue is dealt with through approximations 
now, but may be fixed in future versions of the AAM. The sum 
of the primary and secondary trigger split fractions for each 
LOM scenario will be 100%.  
The AAM calculation sheet is set up in similar manner as 
the M&FM Input sheet. It consists of a matrix that has the 
LOM scenarios and associated data as rows and the abort 
triggers and associated data as columns. The calculation sheet 
reads in data from the M&FM Input sheet. Each trigger has a 
set of calculations that it performs for each LOME scenario; 
they are as follows: 
 True Positive LOM: Portion of LOM scenario 
probability that is successfully detected by a given 
trigger. 
 False Negative LOC: Portion of LOM scenario 
probability that is not detected by either primary or 
secondary triggers, resulting in LOC. 
 AE LOC Residual: Probability associated with 
failure to abort successfully even if a trigger 
properly detects the failure behavior in the LOM 
scenario. 
 LOC Benefit: Probability that a given abort trigger 
saves the crew from immediate launch vehicle 
failure given that it detected the failure behavior 
 
From the definitions above, True Positive LOM (TP LOM) 
probability of primary trigger (ܮܱܯ்௉ೣ ) is related to the 
primary triggers’ probabilistic splits ( ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%ೣ ) of the 
remaining LOM scenario probability that are not subject to 
primary trigger FN (ܨܰ%ೣ), see (1).  
 
 ܮܱܯ்௉ೣ ൌ ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%ೣ ൈ ܮܱܯ்ೣ ൈ ൫1 െ ܨܰ%ೣ൯ (1) 
 
Accounting for AE associated with the specific LOM scenario 
and primary trigger, the LOC Benefit of the primary trigger is 
simply the product of the AE and TP LOM primary trigger 
calculated from (1), see (2), 
 
 ܮܱܥ஻ೣ ൌ ܣܧ%ೣ ൈ ܮܱܯ்௉ೣ  (2) 
 
Because secondary triggers only operate on FN of primary 
triggers, the calculation of TP LOM of secondary triggers 
(ܮܱܯ்௉೤) is similar from that of (ܮܱܯ்௉ೣ ) but with total FN 
LOC from primary triggers and against the remaining LOM 
scenario probability that are not subject to secondary trigger 
FN (ܨܰ%೤), see (3).  
 
 ܮܱܯ்௉೤ ൌ ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%೤ ൈ ቀ1 െ ܨܰ%೤ቁ ൈ ܨ ௅ܰை஼ೣష೅೚೟ೌ೗ (3) 
 
where  
  
 ܨ ௅ܰை஼ೣ೔ ൌ ܮܱܯ்௉ೣ ೔ ൈ
ிே%ೣ೔
ቀଵିிே%ೣ೔ቁ
  
 ܨ ௅ܰை஼ೣష೅೚೟ೌ೗ ൌ ∑ ܨ ௅ܰை஼ೣ೔ே௜ୀଵ   
ܨ ௅ܰை஼ೣష೅೚೟ೌ೗ ൌ ∑ ܮܱܯ்௉ೣ ೔ ൈ
ிே%ೣ೔
ቀଵିிே%ೣ೔ቁ
ே௜ୀଵ    (5) 
 
The LOC Benefit of secondary trigger (ܮܱܯ்௉೤) is calculated 
similarly to that of the LOC Benefit of a primary trigger; it is 
based on the AE associated with the specific LOM scenario 
and secondary trigger, and TP LOM of the secondary trigger, 
see (6). 
 
 ܮܱܥ஻೤ ൌ ܣܧ%೤ ൈ ܮܱܯ்௉೤ (6) 
With all of the calculations completed, the sum of the TP 
LOM and LOC Benefit for each of the triggers are taken and 
compared in a separate worksheet. Because a distribution of 
ATWT in turn determines the uncertainty distribution of AE, 
the overall trigger LOC Benefit can be assessed as a 
distribution or a “range of values”. This allows for initial 
estimates of the uncertainty spread of the variability without 
performing detailed Monte Carlo simulations to gauge the 
worst-on-worst vs. best-on-best vs. “Most Probable” vs. 
average benefit that each of the triggers provides within the 
analyzed trigger suite.  
The process described above is used for any particular 
trigger sets of interest. If one desires to assess the benefit of 
adding or removing additional trigger or triggers, one would 
simply modify the trigger set’s columns, and repeat the 
process. This is necessary because of the intricacies of 
assigning primary and secondary triggers and trigger splits to 
each of the Trigger vs. LOM scenario locations on the 
spreadsheet. The addition or removal of triggers often alters the 
trigger split fractions. By repeating the analysis with a single 
additional candidate trigger a comparison can be made between 
sets of triggers. This gives a Delta LOC Benefit between one 
set of triggers and another set of triggers.  
I. Abortabilty Tables Lookup Script  
To automate the AE lookup from the abortability tables, a 
set of Excel VBA macros were written. There have been 
several enhancements made to the AE lookup macros since its 
first revision to increase its speed, capability and simplicity.  
Housed within a separate Excel file called the Front End, the 
Front End file contains key information regarding the file 
names of the AAM and STE abortability tables, and user 
friendly features. The use of custom combinations of 
abortability tables, booster FTS delay time and LOM scenarios 
subjected to booster free flyers are embedded in the specific 
revision of the AAM to allow a unique AAM file to be adapted 
for specific analysis case.  
The VBA macro performs the following actions upon 
execution. 
1. Open AAM and all abortability tables Excel files 
2. Step through each LOM scenario row in the AAM, 
checking for missing ATWTs for applicable abort 
triggers 
3. Step through each LOM scenario row and read in 
identified mission phase and abortability table type 
used 
4. For each LOM scenario row, step through all abort 
triggers, and perform lookup of the AE from the 
abortability table, based on ATWT, mission phase and 
abortability table ID, fill the relevant AAM cell with 
the AE result 
5. Save the AAM and duplicate the results, and repeat 
Step 3 and 4 to account for booster free flyer risk if the 
user chooses. 
6. Prompt the user that the macro has ended, and close 
appropriate data files. 
 
For inputs into the PRA software, the resulting AE for each 
LOM scenario is reviewed and formatted as a triangular 
distribution. A triangular distribution was used based on a 
recommendation by STE based on the understanding of the 
physics of failure, and modeling and propagation assumptions 
used. The mode of the triangular distribution is set to the base 
AE, and the lower and upper bound are set to the worst and 
best AEs. 
IV. APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY 
This section describes how the analysis methods described 
in the previous section are applied to specific SLS abort 
trigger-related problems. 
A. LOC Benefit of Abort Trigger Suite 
The most important analysis that is performed using the 
methods described in section 3 is the selection of the abort 
trigger suite for the SLS vehicle. As described previously, the 
primary metric of value of an abort trigger is the benefit it 
provides for the crew to escape safety-threatening, SLS-caused 
hazards. If the crew successfully escapes, a potential Loss of 
Crew situation becomes merely a Loss of Mission, and the 
amount of LOC that is avoided by the existence of an abort 
trigger is the value of that abort trigger, its LOC Benefit value. 
The SLS vehicle will use several abort triggers, which are 
collectively known as the abort trigger suite. To analyze the 
value of the suite as a collective, the suite of triggers are added 
to the Abort Analysis Matrix, and evaluated as described in the 
previous section. This analysis assigns the entire amount of 
LOC Benefit to an abort trigger in a failure scenario if it is the 
trigger that activates first. When performed in this way, the 
analysis of the entire suite of triggers provides an accurate 
assessment of the value of the entire abort trigger suite as a 
whole. However, the individual LOC Benefit values for each 
trigger might be considered somewhat misleading, as will be 
described in the next section. Nonetheless, this is the simplest 
method of LOC Benefit evaluation, and it definitely provides a 
clear-cut method to estimate the value of each abort trigger, 
with  the clearest and simplest interpretation. 
B. Delta LOC Benefit of Added Abort Trigger 
While the LOC Benefit calculation method described above 
in Section IV.A provides the simplest calculation and clearest 
interpretation of results, it is in some ways misleading. This is 
because the benefit of an abort trigger should ideally be 
measured as the change in LOC Benefit that is provided by 
adding this trigger to the previously existing set of triggers. 
This is the “Delta LOC Benefit” method. The major difficulty 
with this method is that the value of any single trigger depends 
on the value of all the previously selected triggers, and this in 
turn means that the order in which triggers are selected 
generates a different Delta LOC Benefit value for any added 
trigger! 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the SLS vehicle 
is designed initially without any abort triggers, which means 
that any detection of failures would occur by detection of 
hazards from the MPCV or Mission Operations, or when on the 
ground, from ground systems. These detections and resulting 
abort responses will provide some finite amount of LOC 
Benefit, which can be calculated in the manner described in 
Section III. To determine which abort triggers on the SLS will 
provide maximum improvement to LOC, one could ideally 
assess all possible abort triggers one by one to determine the 
added LOC Benefit they provide compared to the off-vehicle 
set of triggers. Based on this comparison, one can then select 
the trigger with the maximum LOC Benefit, as long as its 
monetary and schedule costs are low, and as long as its 
projected False Positive rate is low enough. 
Once added, this new trigger is added to the existing suite 
of off-board triggers, yielding a trigger suite consisting of the 
off-board set plus one on-board trigger. This new suite can be 
assessed as a group to determine its collective LOC Benefit. 
The analyst can then once again assess all remaining potential 
triggers and calculate their Delta LOC Benefits. Again, one can 
select the next-best trigger, add it to the suite, assess as a group, 
and repeat the process. This process continues until the Delta 
LOC Benefits of the remaining potential triggers are all so low 
as to be not worthwhile to add to the suite. Because every abort 
trigger has a cost in additional Losses of Mission due to False 
Positives, once the Delta LOC Benefit of potential triggers 
begins to approach the probability value of the Delta LOM 
Cost due to the false positives of adding that trigger, it is no 
longer worthwhile to add the new trigger. For launch vehicle 
aborts, every Loss of Mission also produces a small additional 
Loss of Crew, because there are risks associated with every 
abort. Thus the added costs are the added LOM and LOC 
values due to the False Positive rate of the added trigger. 
While the sort of analysis described below can in theory be 
performed, for the SLS vehicle this was not done, due to the 
relative complexity of the method, and also due to schedule and 
resource constraints to perform the work and yet meet program 
schedules and deliveries. However, with the right kind of tool 
(which does not yet exist), this Delta LOC analysis process 
could be automated and done cost-effectively in the future. 
C. Free-Flying Booster Risk 
Booster free-flying (BFF) risk addresses the risk to the 
escaping crew module due to a breakaway, or rogue booster. 
Currently, there is a breakwire between the booster and the 
core stage to address public safety concern of a runaway solid 
booster. The breakwire, which is tied to the booster’s Flight 
Termination System (FTS), is activated if it is severed when 
the booster becomes detached. The breakaway booster scenario 
can occur either due to failure of the booster to core stage 
attachment points during nominal flight, during a vehicle 
failure, such as vehicle explosion or loss of control, or after 
initiation of an abort. Depending on when the booster breaks 
away from the core stage, the average LAS acceleration and 
head start time, and FTS delay time, there is a chance that the 
booster can catch up or overtake the escaping MPCV and 
detonate. The FTS detonation releases booster fragments on the 
crew module if the booster is next to the MPCV at the time of 
detonation. If the booster is in front of the MPCV at the time of 
detonation, then the MPCV will fly into the resulting debris 
field. If the booster is behind the aborting MPCV at the time of 
detonation, then the distance and relative velocity between the 
two must be taken into account in the calculation of the 
likelihood of debris strikes on MPCV. 
The time at which the booster breaks away is important, as 
the acceleration, velocity, and resulting position of the booster 
relative to the MPCV depends on the atmospheric density and 
the booster propellant mass fraction. For a heavier booster in 
low altitude, the booster has more mass to carry, reducing its 
acceleration and therefore reducing its ability to catch up to the 
MPCV, as compared to a booster breakaway higher up in the 
atmosphere, with less friction and less mass, and thus higher 
booster acceleration. For the initial assessment, a simple one-
dimensional trajectory of the MPCV and rogue booster was 
used, and it is assumed that booster breaks away when the 
launch vehicle explodes. The time at which the launch vehicle 
explodes is also a primary factor in the calculation of the 
ATWTs and abortability tables, and thus using the assumption 
that the booster breaks away at the same time as a launch 
vehicle explosion occurs made the determination of the LAS 
head start time very easy. 
For the actual AE assessment, the aforementioned Excel 
VBA macro is used and BFF risk is assessed in Step 5 of the 
aforementioned Abortabilty Tables Lookup Script steps. This 
risk is added to the risks described above for benign, loss of 
control, and explosion failures. If the MPCV does not survive 
the initial SLS failure, then LOC already exists and any 
additional BFF risk does not matter. If the MPCV survives the 
SLS failure, then the BFF risk is applied. The BFF risk is also 
applied to all applicable LOM scenarios, such as premature 
booster separation or vehicle explosion. To account for the 
variability in the FTS activation delay, which for a generic FTS 
can be up to +/- 1 sec, a bounding assessment similar to the 
worst ATWT on worst abortability assumptions is used. This 
results in worst-on-worst-on-worst or best-on-best-on-best 
bounding cases. That is, the worst (shortest) FTS delay time 
AE is operated on the worst ATWT and worst abortability 
table. The final AE for a particular LOM scenario i and trigger 
j is shown in (6): 
 AE୐୓୑	ୗୡୣ୬ୟ୰୧୭౟,ాూూ ൌ 
 ܣܧ௅ைெ	ௌ௖௘௡௔௥௜௢೔,ೕ,ುೝ೐ಳಷಷ ൈ ܣܧ஻ிி|ொ்,஺்ௐ்,ி்ௌ	஽௘௟௔௬ (6) 
D. Limitations & Caveats 
The biggest technical limitation and caveat to the sort of 
analysis described in this paper is the size of the uncertainties 
involved with these calculations. Each group performed their 
own calculations with their own uncertainties and assumptions, 
which are part of the overall abort trigger analysis process. 
Some of these have rather large uncertainties themselves, such 
as the probability of LOM calculations within S&MA PRA, the 
STE blast calculations, and the M&FM estimates of warning 
times. These uncertainties all have to be combined to yield 
something that has meaning when aggregated. In general, the 
group aimed for 5%, mode, mean, and 95% values. In practice, 
it is difficult to know how close the “best case” and “worst 
case” or “mode” values are to the ideal of 5%, mode, and 95% 
without performing full Monte Carlo simulations. At the 
“bottom” of the calculations are always engineering judgments 
being made by the relevant engineers and analysts, which must 
be vetted with other experts to ensure that they are reasonable. 
The analysis described here also requires significant 
resources. For a human-rated launch vehicle, with existing 
groups that perform related work that is already required for 
NASA systems, the resources were available. It was helpful 
that many of the groups already performed analyses that 
generated data similar to what was ultimately needed to 
perform the abort trigger effectiveness calculations and related 
LOC Benefit. Thus S&MA already performed PRAs that 
mainly needed to provide a bit more detail for some failure 
scenarios than they would otherwise have done. GN&C 
analyses of abort triggers did not require any new tools beyond 
those used for nominal analyses, though it did require using 
these tools in somewhat different ways than before. STE 
already performed blast overpressure, debris and fireball 
analyses, and mainly needed to structure those analyses in a 
way that enabled inputs of warning times from the M&FM 
group to provide appropriate outputs of crew survivability in 
differing conditions. The M&FM group, which is historically 
new within NASA MSFC, required the most “new” work, for 
the simple reason that the quantitative analysis of abort triggers 
had never been done before. This entailed development of the 
methodology and the Abort Analysis Matrix tool to mechanize 
the process, and also the establishment of new relationships to 
the other groups to enable this analysis to be performed. For 
other systems such as robotic spacecraft, these resources may 
not be available, and so the detailed process here would need to 
be simplified to enable it to occur. In the long run, SHM/FM 
analyses of the sort described here should become a standard 
feature of an SHM/FM tool suite, making it cost effective for 
most projects. 
Lastly, the analyses we have performed to date uncovered 
or made clear a number of issues that will need to be resolved 
in the future. One is the differentiation of crew survivability 
due to an effective abort, versus crew survivability simply due 
to an explosion being small or with debris by luck not hitting 
the MPCV. This is related to the over-simplified assumption 
that LOC occurs if a secondary abort trigger fails to detect an 
abort condition. The current method of attributing LOC Benefit 
to the first abort trigger that detects an abort condition in a 
LOM scenario needs further refinement. In other words, the 
more accurate method of calculating LOC Benefit is the “Delta 
LOC” methodology described previously, but this supposedly 
more accurate method does not seem to provide a single 
absolute number for LOC Benefit, since it depends on the order 
of selection of previous abort triggers. Finally, issues such as 
the rogue booster described in IV.C above should be directly 
integrated into the analysis through improved abortability 
tables, as opposed to being addressed with a post-processing 
macro as has been performed to date. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The theory of System Health Management and of its 
operational subset Fault Management indicates that quantitative 
analysis of FM Control Loops can be performed, with metrics 
related to state estimation and control. This theory has been 
successfully applied to the selection of abort triggers for the 
NASA SLS vehicle to enable the crew to escape from 
potentially catastrophic hazards. The selection of abort triggers 
is now nearing completion, in which the quantitative 
assessment of the Loss of Crew Benefit of an abort trigger suite 
played a significant role in the decision process. The process is 
now a standard part of the overall design process in SLS, and 
will likely be applied to similar problems in the future at 
NASA MSFC. Based on the successful experience of applying 
SHM/FM, future improvements are envisioned to the 
methodology, to improve its technical accuracy and to reduce 
its future costs through the development of improved tools to 
perform these analyses. 
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